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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant has petitioned for a rehearing on 
the single ground that the opinion of this court here-
in did not deal with the issue of "whether or not non-
appropriated, non-public funds in the possession of USU 
could legally have been used for investment in common 
stock, thus rendering the University's contracts with 
. . .First Equity not ultra vires." (emphasis added). 
'• I" " 
APPELLANT IS IN ERROR IN CONTENDING THAT THE 
OPINION OF THIS COURT DID NOT DEAL WITH THE 
ISSUE ON WHICH APPELLANT GROUNDS ITS PETITION 
FOR REHEARING. 
In speaking of "non-appropriated, non-public 
funds", a term not found in any statute, appellant has 
reference to two sources of funds: 
1. Those funds described in § 53-48-20(3) (d) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which appellant has 
called " .. . funds received from . . . 
development contracts . . . ." (Apprs Brief, 
Pet. for Rehng., p. 3, title of Point II) 
2. Those funds described in § 53-32-4, which 
appellant has called " . . . funds received 
from individual grants. . . ." (App's brief, 
ibid). 
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While it is true this court did not mention 
the so-called individual grant funds of § 53-32-4, its 
opinion considered and expressly rejected appellant's 
contention that the so-called development contract 
monies of § 53-48-20(3) (d) could be legally invested 
in common stock. See the last full paragraph on page 
2 of the opinion. Since the wording of § 53-48-20(3)i' 
2/ is similar to the wording of § 53-32-4-, this 
court's rejection of § 53-48-20(3) as statutory authority 
for investment in common stock of the funds referred 
to therein was also a tacit rejection of § 53-32-4 
with respect to the funds specified therein. 
II 
USU DERIVED NO POWER FROM § 53-32-4 TO 
INVEST DONATED MONIES IN COMMON STOCK 
Even if this court's rejection of § 53-48-20 
(3) as a source of statutory power to purchase common 
stock did not effectively dispose of appellant's 
reliance on § 53-32-4, that reliance is misplaced. 
— "Any institution. . . engaged in a program 
authorized by the Board may: ... (c)Accept contributions, 
grants, or gifts. . . ; (d) Retain, accumulate, in-
vest. . . the funds and proceeds of such authorized pro-
grams. . . ." 
— "The Utah State Agricultural College [Utah 
State University of Agriculture and Applied Science] 
in its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant, 
gift, or devise or bequest any property. . . . Such 
property so received. • • shall be held, invested 
and managed. . . . " 
-2-
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A. Section 53-32-4 Does Not Define What In-
vestments Are Legal For Donated Monies But Only Makes 
Them Eligible For Investment• 
Appellant contends that § 53-32-4 empowers 
USU to invest all property received by private donation 
in any form of investment whatever including stock* 
To construe this section as authorizing USU to invest 
that category of funds in any and all kinds of 
securities is to disregard the language of § 33-1-3, 
discussed on pp. 22-25 of Respondent's Brief on appeal. 
Section 33-1-3 envisions that other laws would supple-
ment and refine those laws empowering agencies to 
invest. Section 53-32-4 is not the kind of law en-
visioned by § 33-1-3 in that it does not declare "what 
shall be legal investments." In other words, § 53-32-4 
by itself does not empower USU to invest these monies; 
it only makes them available for investment in "legal 
investments" as otherwise "declared" by legislation. 
Appellant's argument is defective in that it refuses to 
acknowledge that for a state agency to invest money in 
its custody in any securities, two things must be present. 
First, there must be a statute empowering the agency 
to invest enumerated funds in its possession; and 
secondly, there must be a statute which enumerates the 
-**-
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securities in which the agency can legally invest 
those funds. These two related but distinct powers, 
typically, are found in tv/o separate statutes. Thus, 
a Wyoming statute, enacted four years before Utah 
enacted § 33-1-1, states, in relevant part: 
"It shall be lawful for the state 
of Wyoming and • . . institutions 
and agencies thereof, to invest 
their funds and the moneys in their 
custody or possession, eligible 
for investment, in bonds and 
debentures. . . of the Federal 
Housing Administration, etc. 
(emphasis added)" (Wyoming Senate 
File No- 9, 1935). 
Similarly, § 35-351, Arizona Revised Statutes 
Annotated, states: 
"The state treasurer. . .shall invest 
. . . monies authorized by law to 
be invested in securities as defined 
by law, . . . in bonds of the 
United ^ States. . . etc. (emphasis 
added)" 
Finally, the Utah Legislature understands 
the difference between statutory authority to in-
vest at all, and statutory authority defining those 
investments which are legal, having recognized that 
difference in 1957 in adding a sentence to § 33-1-1 
which read: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"any . . . officer of the state 
government, empowered to make in-
vestments of the State Insurance Fund, 
• . . is hereby authorized to invest 
said funds in obligations or loans 
insured by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration, etc. (emphasis added)" 
The only thing done by § 53-32-4 for donated 
monies is to make those funds eligible for investment 
by the University; one must look elsewhere for a 
list of legal investments for those funds. Al-
though § 33-1-1 provides such a list, its list does 
not include common stock. 
To read Section 53-32-4 as defendants con-
tend would logically require the court to hold that 
the category of funds described therein could be 
legally invested in anything? such a construction 
flies in the teeth of the common law presumption that 
a municipal corporation may not spend money for 
speculation, and the public law canon of construction 
that powers to contract for items other than necessaries 
shall be strictly construed. See pp. 21-22 of Respondent's 
Brief on appeal. 
B. The Law Seeks To Safeguard Monies 
Donated to a Public Entity to the Same Extent as 
Monies Appropriated Thereto. 
The fact that the monies referred to in 
Section 53-32-4 have not been appropriated by the 
Legislature, but rather come from other sources, 
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does not render inapplicable the common lav; 
("Dillons") rule that a public body has only those 
powers specifically conferred upon it by statute. 
Not only does logic require that monies given 
voluntarily to USU receive the same protection 
as monies given involuntarily through taxation but 
the case law supports this proposition* 
In State ex rel Davis v. Clausen, 160 
Wash. 618, 295 Pac. 751, 757 (1931), the court 
held that federal monies intended for Washington 
State College but received by the state treasurer 
were subject to a Washington statute prohibiting 
the state treasurer from transferring monies to 
the college without a legislative appropriation, 
notwithstanding statutory language providing 
that monies received from the United States for 
the benefit of the college, when deposited with 
the treasurer, 
" . . . shall be held as special 
funds for said college, and are 
hereby appropriated to the uses 
and purposes for which the same are 
received." 
The court held that money coming into the custody 
of the state treasurer, although specifically ear-
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marked for the use of the State College and by statute 
"appropriated to the uses and purposes" of the college, 
partook of the same character as monies received by 
the state treasurer from state appropriations in 
the sense that only a legislative appropriation could 
authorize the treasurer to disburse them out to 
the college. 
In Mahon v. Board of Education of City of 
New York, 63 N.E. 1107 (N.Y., 1902), the court held 
that a constitutional provision forbidding any city 
to give money in aid of any individual applies to 
money the city received from sources other than public 
taxation* 
In Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N.E. 
251 (1936) , the Indiana Supreme Court squarely held 
that monies donated to Purdue University (a land 
grant college, like USU) were to be treated the same 
as state funds once they were received; therefore, 
they could only be spent as the Legislature directed. 
The court reasoned, at p. 261, as follows: 
"When the trustors created the trusts 
and placed them in the hands of public 
officers they must be deemed to have 
understood that the discretion of those 
officers concerning the details of 
safeguarding and preserving the corpus 
of the trust, and insuring the safety 
-7-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and availability of current 
funds, could be and might be 
controlled by the Legislature," 
See also State ex rel. University of Utah 
v. Candland, 36 Ut. 406, 425-426, 104 Pac. 285 
(1909); University of North Carolina v> Maultsby, 
43 N.C. 257, 264 (1852); and Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v, Winston, 5 Stewart & 
P. 17, (Ala., 1833) to the effect that property 
owned by state-controlled universities (like 
USU) is actually property of the state. 
C. Stocks Are Not Investments Within the 
Meaning of § 53-32-4 (Dealing with "Donated Monies") 
Passed in 1929. 
Assuming, arguendo, that it is not necessary 
to be able to point to another statute containing 
a list of "legals" for "donated monies" (an 
assumption USU has shown to be erroneous, above), 
the brokers1 reliance on the language in § 53-32-4, 
which states that USU may "invest" these monies, 
is not well founded. This statute was passed in 
1929. In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, 
reference of course must be had to the commonly 
accepted usage of words used in a bill at the time 
the bill was passed. The question then should be 
asked, what did the word "invest" mean in 1929. 
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Specifically, did it include the purchase of common 
stock? The answer is found in law dictionaries 
of the day. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Re-
vision, published in 1914, contains only one defini-
tion of the word investment as follows: 
"a sum of money left for safe-
keeping, subject to order, and 
payable not in the specific money 
deposited, but in an equal sum; 
it may or may not bear interest, 
according to the agreement." 
State v. McFetridge, (Wise, 1893) 
54 N'.W. 11 
According to that definition, the deposit of money 
in a bank is an investment, but the purchase of common 
stock is not. 
D. The Sendak Case Is Hot Good Authority 
That Donated Monies Are Eligible For Investment In 
Stock. 
In its brief, appellant refers to Sendak v. 
Trustees of Indiana University, 254 Ind. 390, 260 
N.E. 2d 601 (1970). However, in that case, con-
trary to appellants1 assertion, the court did not 
construe a statute "very similar" to § 53-32-4. 
Indeed, the holding there that the trustees of 
Indiana University could invest donated monies in 
common stock was not based on any statute at all. 
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In Sendak, the court was faced with the simple 
question of whether Indiana University could 
use donated monies to buy stock in a private 
corporation without violating the Indiana Con-
stitution prohibiting the State of Indiana from 
becoming a stockholder in a private corporation. 
The court concluded that it could do so, on 
the ground that Indiana University had been held 
to be a "private corporation" by prior decisions 
and not part of the State; the monies, there-
fore, never became property of the State and thus 
could be managed free from state restrictions. 
260 N.E. 2d 601, 604. In contrast, the Utah 
Supreme Court has on two occasions soundly re-
jected the argument that USU (and the University 
of Utah) are corporations separate and apart from 
the State of Utah. University of Utah v. Board 
3/ 
of Examiners, supra, p. 426.— Spence v. USAC, 119 
U. 104, 113-114, 225 P.2d 18. Moreover, the Utah 
Legislature has never believed that monies donated 
to USU do not become subject to the control of 
the state; this clearly appears from the passage 
of an act in 1925, found in Chapter 16 of the 
Session Laws for that year. Section 6 of that 
-/* Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348 (1956). 
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Act states, in relevant part: 
"All monies received by the 
University of : tah or the Agricul-
tural College of Utah from any 
source whatsoever; shall be paid 
Tntb the state treasury at the close 
of the months of June and December 
of each year and shall be placed 
to the credit of the maintenance 
account of the respective institu-
tion." (all emphasis added) 
The above statute was itself merely a rephrasing 
of statutory language appearing as early as 1917. 
At no time in the some thirty years or more that 
language was law was it even challenged, let alone 
held to be invalid. 
E. Section 53-32-4 Does Not Allow The 
Donor To Determine How His Donation Is Thereafter 
Invested, 
Respondent understands appellant to argue 
that the intent of § 53-32-4 was to authorize USU 
to invest donated monies, or the proceeds of donated 
properties converted into money, in a manner consistent 
4/ 
with the desires of the donor.-- If this is 
—
/
 "The Utah Legislature made it clear in 1929 
that it intended the Board of Trustees to use the 
proceeds of private gfits, bequests and trusts in a 
manner consonant with the conditions imposed by the 
donors thereof, as the Sendak court held was the case 
in Indiana." App!s Brief, Pet. for Rehrng., p. 8 
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appellant's contention, it is not supported by the 
language of the section. The sentence in question 
reads: "Such property so received or converted 
shall be held, invested and managed and the 
proceeds thereof used by the, board of trustees 
for the purposes and under the conditions pre-
scribed in the grant or donation (emphasis 
added)." The language underlined surely refers 
to the purposes for which the gift, devise or 
bequest is ultimately intended, e.g. for the library, 
scholarships, athletic program, etc. In other 
words, this language makes clear that not only 
the corpus of a gift, devise or bequest should 
be used "for the purposes and under the conditions" 
prescribed in the gift but also the interest 
(used in the wide sense of trust lav/) generated 
by the corpus. Thus, the terra "proceeds" as 
used in this sentence means interest so defined. 
Appellant further argues that § 51-7-13, 
part of the State Money Management Act of 1974, 
affords "funds from private sources the same 
treatment, more complete and detailed, than [the 
Legislature] had previously [in § 53-32-4]." If 
__i o_ 
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appellant means by this that § 53-32-4 allows 
donors or testators to specify the manner in which 
their donations are invested pending the application 
of the gift, devise or bequest to the ultimate 
university purposes specified, appellant's statement 
is incorrect; for not even § 51-7-13 allows the 
"dead-hand" of the testator to do this but merely 
allows a donor or testator, by providing in 
the terms of the gift, devise or bequest that it 
shall not be invested in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the money management council, to 
cause that the gift or grant be invested according 
to the prudent man standard of § 33-2-1^/ As noted 
in Storen v. Sexton, supra, benefactors of USU must be 
deemed to have understood that the legislature might 
impose rules to govern the safeguarding and preserving 
of the corpus of their benefactions. This observation 
is equally true with respect to § 53-32-4, passed in 
1929, as it is to § 51-7-13, passed in 1974. Under 
neither section can a benefactor specify how he wants 
his gift or grant invested once he has parted with it. 
~/§ 51-7-13(b) reads: 
"All funds acquired by gift, devise, or 
bequest or by federal or private grant shall 
be invested in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the council unless the terms 
of the gift or grant provide otherwise, in 
which event these funds shall be invested and 
managed in accordance with the standards specified 
in section 33-2-1." 
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Ill 
EVEN IF SOME DONATED MONIES WERE 
LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR THE PURCHASE 
OF STOCK, APPELLANT HAD THE DUTY 
TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE MONIES USU'S 
AGENT USED TO PURCHASE STOCK THROUGH 
IT WERE IN FACT SUCH AVAILABLE 
MONIES. 
A. Section 22-1-5 of the Utah Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act Does Not Apply to these Facts, 
Appellant argues from § 22-1-5 of the Utah 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act that if only a fraction of 
the funds in USU's investment pool were actually 
available under lav; for the purchase of common 
stock, then the purchase of stock with any funds 
of the pool was legal. Apart from the obvious 
fact that the salutary purpose for applying a 
rule of strict statutory construction herein — 
the safeguarding and preservation of public 
monies — would be subverted if this argument 
prevailed, § 22-1-5 does not even apply to the 
facts of this case. As stated by this court in 
Sugarhouse Finance v. Zions First National Bank, 
21 Utah 2d 68, 440 P.2d 869 (1968): 
"The purposes to be accomplished 
by this [Uniform Fiduciaries] Act 
would seem to be to facilitate 
banking and financial transactions 
by relieving the depositary banks 
and others dealing with a fiduciary 
from the duty imposed at common 
law of seeing that fiduciary 
-14-
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funds are properly applied to the 
account of the principal. In 
other words, the statute places a 
duty upon principals to use only 
honest fiduciaries, and gives 
relief to those who deal with 
fiduciaries except where they 
know the fiduciary is breaching 
his duty to his principal or 
where they have knowledge of 
such facts that their action in 
dealing with the fiduciary 
amounts to bad faith (emphasis 
added)." 21 Utah 2d, pp. 69-70. 
The operative language of § 22-1-5 relied upon 
states that the "payee" of a check "is not bound 
to inquire whether [a] fiduciary is committing a 
breach of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing" the 
check unless he takes the check with actual or con-
structive notice of the breach. In the case at 
hand, there was no issue of Catron, USU's investment 
officer, breaching his obligation to USU under 
§ 22-1-5 because he never drew the check (the stock 
was never paid for). But even if § 22-1-5 means more 
than it says, Catron, still, breached no obliga-
tion even in ordering the stock. On the theory 
of this case as decided below, if some funds 
in the investment pool were legally available 
for common stock when he placed orders for the 
stock, and the remainder was not, Catron did not 
-15-
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know it; indeed, USUfs administration and Institu-
tional Council believed all monies in the pool 
could rightfully be used to purchase stock and 
no allegation is made that Catron knew other-
6/ 
wise.—' 
Appellant's argument based on § 22-1-5 
of the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act is miscon-
ceived for yet another reason. The purpose 
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act has been said 
to be to harmonize the common lav/ theory that 
one deals with a fiduciary at his peril "with 
the provisions of the uniform negotiable in-
7/ 
struments act11—7 ; or as expressed by another 
court, to "facilitate banking transactions by 
relieving a depository . . . of the duty of 
inquiry as to the right of its depositors, 
even though fiduciaries, to check out their 
8/ 
accounts."~ As yet another court noted: 
—Appellant never alleged that USU had power 
to invest in stock only funds from a specified 
source,e.g. § 53-32-4 monies. 
-'Wysowatcky v. Denver - Willys, 281 P.2d 
165, 167 (Colo., 1955). 
8/ 
Transport Trucking Company vs. First 
National Bank in Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 320, 330 
P.2d 476, 479 (1956") . 
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"The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 
hereinafter called the Act, was 
drawn by a committee of the 
Conference on Uniform State 
Laws, after a request by bankers 
that a rule be made by statute 
to determine when the form of 
an instrument imposes a duty of 
making inquiry upon persons 
dealing with fiduciaries. It 
was mentioned in the committee 
reports to the conference that 
there were general objections 
to such a measure and also 
specific objections to it as an 
amendment of the Negotiable 
Instruments Law, Nevertheless, 
because of the appeal of the 
banking interest and the general 
feeling of the conference, the 
committee felt under a duty to 
proceed with the preparation of 
a uniform act and let the confer-
ence weigh the arguments for and 
against legislation on the sub-
ject. Professor Austin Scott 
made a study of the question and 
prepared a draft of the Act, 
which wasQadopted substantially as 
written."— 
Appellant does not contend that, under the 
facts of this case, banking transactions would 
be hampered if § 22-1-5 were not applied. Indeed, 
appellant's argument would be the same whether 
Catron intended to pay for the stock (it was 
never paid for) with cash or by check. In sum, 
Guaranty Bank &>Trust Company of Alex-
andria vs. C & R Development Co., 241 So. 2d 14, 21 
(La. App., 1970), dissenting opinion. 
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appellant has cited a section of banking law 
to reach a desired result in the context of 
public lav; in which the section has no applica-
tion. 
To apply § 22-1-5 here, even assuming 
§ 53-32-4 monies are legally available to 
purchase stock, would be to both ignore the 
purpose behind the Fiduciaries Act and to 
open the door for subsequent raids on the public 
treasury. Appellant cannot be said to be 
unduly burdened to see that public funds are 
not spent for a purchase not authorized by law. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to appellant's assertion, 
this court did in effect dispose of the argu-
ment — on which the petition for rehearing is 
almost solely based — that § 53-32-4 empowered 
USU to invest at least the monies specified 
therein in stock. If, however, the court's 
failure to mention § 53-32-4 in its opinion 
is not a result of the court assuming that its 
discussion of § 53-48-20(3) would be understood 
to apply, with appropriate changes to § 53-32-4, 
independent reasons set forth above should compel 
this court to reject the latter section as a 
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statutory basis for investing in common stock 
without the necessity of a rehearing. Finally, 
even if this court is persuaded that § 53-32-4 
empowered USU to invest without restriction the 
monies referred to therein, appellant is not 
entitled to summary judgment based on § 2 2-1-5 
(of the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act). 
The petition for rehearing should be 
denied. 
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